

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1211520-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 121
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Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct;
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X For this Page X
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1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

SAC, New York

April 2, 1957

Director, FBI

63-80750-2960

RECORDED

INDEXED

b3

Enclosed herewith is a copy of

b3

A review of the Bureau's files has failed to
disclose any information identifiable with

b3

The above information and enclosure are being
referred to you for your information.

b3

Enclosure

SJP:bal
(6)

APR 5 1957
FBI - NEW YORK

RECORDED

APR 5 1957

143
143
143

4-528

62-80750-2961
CHANGED TO
105-59697-X1

APR 30 1957

J. M.

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 1, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Wright
Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Massey
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 18,

1957.

b3

[REDACTED]

Papich

[REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bal

(4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED 17
INDEXED 17

62-80750-2962

53 APR 8 1957

APR 4 1957

EX-132

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 03-11-2013
 C24W16B80

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 3/26/57

FROM : Legat, Tokyo, Japan (66-4)

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Re mylet 12/11/56.

b3

b3

b3

b3

The above is submitted for information only.

AJN:cs
 (3)

1-D

50 APR 15 1957 b3²⁰

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Trotter
 Mr. Nease
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Holloman
 Miss Gandy
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

b3

RECORDED 9
 INDEXED 9

62-80750-2963
 20 APR 8 1957

James J. [Signature]

62-80750 2964 IN THIS FILE SKIPPED DURING
SERIALIZATION.

string
6-14-62
MC

0-19 (1d-22-55)

CIA Chief Accused of Girl Lure



ALLEN DULLES

Allen W. Dulles is being accused by Soviet Russia of using fancy women to corrupt the Reds' Olympic teams, The New York Herald Tribune said today in a copyright story under a Moscow dateline.

The newspaper said the "gamy charge" against the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency chief was made in the Soviet Little Gazette, which reflected official inspiration.

The communist paper implied Mr. Dulles used other methods, to corrupt Soviet athletes, but they pushed his hypotheses aside and went on to win the game.

A "team of professional American spies and provocateurs tried to subvert the Russian sportsmen by attempted kidnaping, sneak-thievery and frameups on espionage charges," The Herald-Tribune's dispatch quoted the Moscow paper.

This, the dispatch pointed out, was the first time Mr. Dulles' purported activities were charged by the Soviets, altho the games took place four months ago and were attended by scores of

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Wash. Post and Times Herald
Wash. News 3
Wash. Star
N. Y. Herald Tribune
N. Y. Mirror
N. Y. Daily News
Daily Worker
The Worker
New Leader

Date 4-3-57

62-80750-2966
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ALW 4/10*

DATE: April 8, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R.R.*SUBJECT: *C*ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Isop
 chols
 ardmad
 lmont
 Mason
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

Reference is made to the enclosed article which appeared in the "Washington Daily News," on April 3, 1957. The Soviets have made an accusation that Allen Dulles of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used "fancy women" in an attempt to "corrupt" the Soviet Olympic teams.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

Enclosure

SJP/bjt
(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Section Tickler
 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 21
 INDEXED - 21

APR 11 1957

ENCLOSURE

44-132

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *abw*

DATE: April 8, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

You have previously received information through
 Liaison concerning [redacted]

oral communication *RP*
 Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mason
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

b3

The Liaison Agent has observed that [redacted]

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt/bjt
(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Section Tickler
 1 - Mr. Papich

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 03-11-2013
 C24W16B80

RECORDED-35

62-80750-2967

20 APR 15 1957

64 APR 18 1957

F2b
RP
LIAISON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *10s*


DATE: April 15, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *RP*SUBJECT: DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80


Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Bratton

b3



b3

There is enclosed herewith 

b3

RECORDED - 51

*P*ACTION:

None. For your information.

Enclosure

SJP:bal *RP*

(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Papich

72
 APR 24 1957
 ENCL 1
RP

EX-108

62-80750-2970

APR 18 1957

5
RP

4-528

62-80750-2971

CHANGED TO

62-104072-X

JUL 3 1957

W. C.

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: April 17, 1957

FROM : MR. S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT:

Branigan
Branigan
Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

b3

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Espionage and Internal Security Sections.

SJP:bal *cal*
(5)

RECORDED - 50

INDEXED - 50

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

62-80750-2972

12 APR 24 1957

71 APR 29 1957

EX-132

Rec'd
FSP
SAC

12 APR 29 1957

INDEXED 83

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: April 23, 1957


FROM : MR. S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: 


b3

Branigan

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____



b3

A review of the Bureau's files has failed to disclose
any information identifiable with 

b3

113d

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention
of the Espionage Section.

SJP:jlk/jw
(4)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED 83
INDEXED 83
62-86750-2973
20 APR 25 1957

5/ Chaffey
4/ 25/57

71... 1st 1957
EX-132

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

DATE: April 11, 1957

b3

b3

b3

b3

JJM:vw
(3)

1d

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

62-80750-2974
10 APR 26 1957

67 APR 30 1957 C4

EXPD. PROC.

APR 17 1957

Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 1, 1957

FROM : MR. S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: 

b3




Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____



b3

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the attention
 of the Special Inquiry Section, Investigative Division 

b3

SJP:jk

(4)

1 - Mr. Callan
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 67

INDEXED - 67

ENCL 01

62-80750-2978

6 MAY 2 1957



5-69-9-1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 1, 1957

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
PROPOSED INVESTIGATION BY
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Trotter
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

Special Agent Richard F. McIlwain called me about 1:00 p.m. today and said that he had received his indoctrination as the new Director of the Investigative Staff of the House Appropriations Committee. As of today, Mr. McIlwain moved up from the position of Assistant Director to Director when Special Agent Charles G. Haynes returned to the Bureau this morning.

Mr. McIlwain stated he was called to a conference by Russ Orescan, who is a clerk who has over-all supervision of the appropriations for the military agencies. Orescan told McIlwain that he had a proposed directive for the Investigative Staff to investigate CIA. Orescan explained that Chairman Cannon had pointed out that the five top members of the Appropriations Committee are not satisfied with CIA operations and they desire that CIA be investigated. Orescan also stated that the Chairman desired that Bureau personnel exclusively be utilized on this investigation since the members of the Investigative Staff who would work on it would have to be cleared for secret and top secret information and because the Chairman felt that the FBI was the only one qualified to make the inquiry.

Mr. McIlwain stated there were five points outlined in the proposed draft instructing that the inquiry be made. The five points are as follows:

1. An analysis of the organizational structure of CIA from the standpoint of effective intelligence.
2. A breakdown of fiscal years 1957 and 1958 requests for appropriations by major sources of intelligence.
3. General evaluation of accuracy and importance of intelligence processed and referred to using agencies.

cc: Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Holloman

JPM:eam

(6)

66 MAY 20 1957

RECORDED - 97 62-80750-2980

INDEXED - 97 3 MAY 8 1957

LIAIS
PEN

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Proposed Investigation by
House Appropriations Committee

4. List of other agencies working with CIA, which gather intelligence, including number of personnel and annual operating cost for intelligence purposes. (McIlwain said that according to Orescan this applies to agencies operating overseas.)
5. List, and very brief description of activities, other than directly related to intelligence, conducted by CIA in fiscal year 1957 and proposed for fiscal year 1958.

McIlwain subsequently advised me that he learned from Orescan that Orescan had the conference with Chairman Cannon and Chairman Cannon had put in a call for the Director; however, the Director was out of the office. Orescan said that Cannon apparently wants to talk to the Director about the reason for the inquiry and why the top five Committee members think it is desirable and why Chairman Cannon feels that the inquiry should be conducted by FBI personnel.

I have discussed the proposed directive with Mr. Belmont and he agrees with me that the Bureau should not become involved in such an inquiry of CIA. Certainly such an inquiry cannot do the Bureau any good and it would be a rather odd situation for one intelligence agency in the executive branch of the Government to be inspecting and objectively criticizing another one. Many of the answers to the proposed directive by the Committee would necessarily have to be opinions not necessarily based on fact. The proposed Item Three is a good example of where opinion of the inspecting or investigating staff would have to be injected into the answers.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau not become involved in the inquiry of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I agree.
we should
not get
involved
in this

DeGroote
— At the request of Chairman Cannon I saw Orescan & explained my objections & concerning the Senate Select Committee with C. I. T. he admitted —

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

b3

ACTION:

It is recommended that [redacted]

b3

gd
ASAP
mr
100

Office Memorandum

VERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-356015)
 FROM : *JFC* ATTENTION: FOREIGN LIAISON DESK
 SUBJECT: SAC, PHOENIX (100-3670)

DATE: 4-24-57




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During a routine call




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


b3

The Phoenix Office, of course, has



b3



b3

4 - Bureau ~~RECORDED~~ 62-80705-
 1 - Phoenix (100-3670) ~~RECORDED~~
 JEG:wma *4/28/57* *5/8/57* *4/28/57*
 (5) *RECD-O-FOREIGN DESK*

62-80705-
 RECORDED
 APR 26 1957 MAY 8 1957

me to Belmont
3/1/57
get to Phoenix
5/8/57
1/2/57

EXP. PROC.

PX: 100-3670

[redacted] b3

[redacted] b3

Phoenix would appreciate any comments from the bureau regarding this possibility and any suggestion about how it can be met.

Extra copies of this letter are being furnished the bureau for possible forwarding to the Legat at Mexico City.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 3, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

R *Aut/br*
R *PR*

On the morning of May 3, 1957, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] CIA, telephonically advised the Liaison Agent
 that [REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] further
 stated that he was informing our Pittsburgh Office concerning
 [REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the
 attention of the Investigative Division.

SJP:bjt/yt
 (6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Schaller
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

62-80750-2981

EX 105 MAY 8 1957

71 MAY 10 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

GIR 1

DATE: May 6, 1957

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BY HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 McRae _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Richard McIlwain, Special Agent and Staff Director of the Investigative Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, called me this morning and stated that he was endeavoring to line up some former Special Agent who could head up the investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the House Appropriations Committee. He said that he saw former Special Agent Kenneth McIntire yesterday in connection with this matter and McIntire pointed out that he retired from the Office of Special Investigations and was going with Capital Airlines on June 1, 1957, to be in charge of a new training program. McIntire stated that as a result, he would not have time to devote to such a project as the House Appropriations Committee proposes with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency.

McIlwain stated he had previously talked to Mr. D. M. Ladd and Mr. Ladd said he wasn't interested because he would be tied up on his present assignment until June 30, 1957, and Mr. Ladd didn't feel he should become involved in such an inquiry.

McIlwain stated that the Committee desired that the inquiry be completed and a report submitted by no later than June 22, 1957, and therefore any inquiry would have to be very limited and would have to be conducted under an emergency crash basis.

Mr. McIlwain stated that the name of former Inspector Thomas Naughten had been furnished to him as a possibility for heading up the staff and unless I had some objections, he planned on furnishing Naughten's name to Congressman Cannon this morning with the idea of letting Congressman Cannon work out the loan of Naughten for this assignment.

The foregoing is submitted for your information and McIlwain stated he would keep me advised of any further developments.

JPM:eam
(2)

RECORDED - 55
INDEXED - 55

62-80750-2982

MAY 9 1957

THREE

UNRECORDED - 55
INDEXED - 55
Autostamped

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT (B5/14/57)

DATE: February 26, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

b3

SUBJECT:

Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mason
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

Callan *Stanley*

Reference is made to the enclosed letter from
the Washington Field Office dated February 15, 1957.

b3

On February 25, 1957,
CIA advised Agent Panich on a strictly confidential basis that

b3

Both the Washington Field Office and the Liaison Agent
are
has indicated to the Liaison Agent that

b3

ACTION:INDEXED-5
RECORDED-5

62-80750-2983

None. For your information.

SJP:bal *ewl*
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Callan
- 1 - Mr. Stanley
- 1 - Liaison Section

EX-132

✓

23 MAY 20 1957

50 MAY 21 1957 Papich

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 9, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b3

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] *R. Roach*

b3

Referral/Consult

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

ACTION:

b3

The Liaison Agent will continue to be on the alert for any additional information relating to the instant matter.

SJ/bjt (6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Kibbigh
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. [REDACTED] MAY 20 1957

62-80750-1
NOT RECORDED
145 MAY 15 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: May 14, 1957

TO : MR. MOHR

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN *ppc*

SUBJECT:

Richard McIlwain, Chief of the Investigative Staff, House Appropriations Committee, telephonically advised the writer last night that he and Corhal D. Orescan of the House Appropriations Committee had conferred with former Special Agent Robert Collier on the possibility of Collier's directing the staff to inquire into the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

McIlwain stated he wanted to advise the Bureau that Collier while interested was committed to the extent with other clients and he would not be able to undertake such an inquiry until the latter part of the Summer or early Fall.

As a result, McIlwain indicated that Orescan was going to confer with Chairman Cannon of the House Appropriations Committee and endeavor to have Cannon forego the inquiry into CIA until such time as a capable person could be obtained to head up this inquiry.

McIlwain indicated that he desired the Bureau to have this information promptly in the event Collier should request to see the Director. This is submitted for information and record purposes only. McIlwain will keep the Bureau advised of developments in connection with this matter.

NPC:gt

2

C.C: MR. HOLLOWAY

John ✓
5/14

62-180750-
NOT RECORDED
76 MAY 21 1957
• MAY 21 1957

61 MAY 24 1957

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-180750

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 16, 1957

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

b3

Reference is made to

b3
b7D

100-3-94
1 - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Reach
Mr. Lenz

62-180750-1
NOT RECORDED

NOT RECORDED

76 MAY 24 1966

15 MAY 22 1957

h3

60 MAY 28 1957

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

RE:

100-3-94

b3

Inasmuch as

b3
b7D

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter

b3
b7D

That attached letter be transmitted to CIA
through our liaison representative who is coordinating
this matter.

*C. W. B.
A. J. M.*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: May 16, 1957

FROM : L. B. NICHOLS *ppk*SUBJECT: *Central Intelligence*

ppk
 The Chief of the Fire Department at Brandywine, Maryland, a Mr. Loveday, attempted to telephonically contact me at 9:05 A. M. today. Due to my being tied up, I had DeLoach talk with Loveday.

Chief Loveday indicated that he had some serious information which involved indiscretions on the part of one or more officials of CIA. He stated the matter came within the jurisdiction of the FBI and that he would appreciate an agent calling upon him for further facts inasmuch as he did not desire to discuss the matter over the telephone. He was advised that we would have an agent call on him.

After talking with Loveday, SAC Brown of Baltimore was advised of the above facts and instructed to have an agent call on Mr. Loveday.

cc-Mr. Belmont (Mr. Papich)
 CDD:jmr *ppk*
 (3)

INDEXED - 33
 RECORDED - 33

62-20750-2984

10 MAY 21, 1957

ppk
 MAY 21 1957

ppk

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holoman	_____
Gandy	_____

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Tic: Mr. Garrett

SAC, Washington Field (fig. 61)

May 15, 1967

Director, FBI (100-343636)

b3
b7D

A representative of the Bureau was informed confidentially [redacted]

b3
b7D

This is for your information only in the event

b3
b7D

CFG: $bab \rightarrow ab$
(4)

62-80750-2985

(4) NOTE: Bufile's negative as to any previous ~~connection~~ ~~connection~~

b3
b7D

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Stebbins _____
 Belmont _____
 Moore _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Roosa _____
 Tamm _____
 Moore _____
 Winslow _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b3
b7D

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: May 10, 1957

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3
b7D

Tom Donegan of the Subversive Activities Control Board
advised this afternoon that [REDACTED]

b3
b7D

D.P.

P.A.

b3
b7D

[REDACTED]

b3
b7D

It is recommended this memorandum
be routed for the attention of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

JJM:hpf

(4)

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont

X V. M

INDEXED
ESP. SEC.NOT RECORDED
76 MAY 22 1957

EX-151

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [REDACTED]

Legal Attaché, Rio de Janeiro

May 16, 1957

Director, FBI

b3

RECORDED - 39 62-80750-2986
Reurist 5/3/57 advising that [redacted]

PERIODICALS

b3

b6
b7c

Bureau files reflect also that [redacted]

b3

You should be alert for any indication that [redacted] in
order that the Bureau may be properly apprised and appropriate
action taken.

b3

UNRECORDED COMM FILED IN 62-80750-215-1 ✓

Tolson ✓ 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)
Nichols ✓ WFE
Boardman ✓
Belmont ✓ WFE: 1mm
Mason ✓ (5) ✓
Mohr ✓
Parsons ✓
Rosen ✓
Tamm ✓ Mail Room ✓ LBW ✓
Lease ✓
Ferrord ✓
H. Room ✓
Galt ✓
S-28-57 S-29-57

LEGAT
9 - MAY 17
COMM-FBI

RECORDED COMM FILED IN 62-80750-215-1 ✓
JUN 11 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legal Attaché, Rio de Janeiro

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

DATE: May 3, 1957

b3

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ReRiolet 2-27-57. which advised that [Redacted]

b3

b3

JJM:vw
(4)
cc: 64-5

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

EXP. PROC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 64-57-153

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

MAY 21 1957

FILED

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
5-28-57 5-27-57 62-672

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legal Attache, Havana, Cuba (66-18)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH THE CIA

DATE: May 15, 1957

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamim
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The following is thought to be of possible interest to the

Bureau:

b3

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

B G. Carter

X 105

INDEXED - 81

62-80750-2987

RECORDED - 81

Havana newspapers on the morning of May 10, 1957, all published a photograph showing Mr. KIRKPATRICK, President BATISTA'S Ambassador GARDNER and Dr. REY. All these newspapers printed the same caption under the photograph, this indicating that the caption was probably released from the Presidential Palace together with the photograph. This caption uniformly described Mr. KIRKPATRICK as "a key official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Washington, D. C.". The caption also mentioned that in addition to the others present, Mr. WILLIAM B. CALDWELL of the Embassy staff was present at the meeting. Enclosure (1)

CDA:ptm

(3)


ENCLOSURE

67 MAY 23 1957

b3



This is furnished for the Bureau's information. Attached is
clipping from the May 10, 1957, issue of the Havana Post which contains
the photograph and the caption mentioned above.



LYMAN KILPATRICK, a high official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Washington, D. C., paid a courtesy visit to President Batista yesterday at the Palace. He was accompanied by U. S. Ambassador Arthur Gardner and William B. Caldwell, also of the embassy staff. Shown above are from left to right Kilpatrick, President Batista, Ambassador Gardner and Santiago C. Rey, Minister of the Interior who heads the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities (BRAC).

The Havana Post
Havana, Cuba
May 10, 1957

62

ENCLOSURE

May 16, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

On Wednesday, May 1, 1957, I saw Mr. Corhal F. Orescan, the Staff Director of the House Appropriations Committee, who called after Congressman Clarence Cannon, the Chairman of that Committee, had spoken to me on the phone asking me to see Mr. Orescan about a very urgent and important matter.

Mr. Orescan informed me that the Chairman was desirous of having assigned to the Committee on loan a number of Agents who would be qualified to make an investigation of the over-all operations and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I told Mr. Orescan that while I have always tried to promptly meet the wishes of the Chairman, in this particular matter, I felt it would be most inadvisable and undesirable for any personnel of this Bureau to be assigned to the Committee for such a purpose. I advised Mr. Orescan that over the years in columns and articles there had been certain insinuations that the FBI was jealous of and desirous of taking over CIA. I added there, of course, was no foundation for any such suspicions, but that nevertheless, they had prevailed, and that for any personnel of this Bureau, even on loan, to be assigned by a Congressional Committee to conduct an investigation of CIA would inevitably revive the stories which had previously appeared and the Bureau would be subject to severe criticism by the Central Intelligence Agency and persons particularly friendly to it.

NOT RECORDED

I told Mr. Orescan that if the Chairman insisted upon this matter being given consideration, it would be necessary for me to speak to the Attorney General about it because I would not feel authorized to accede to the Chairman's request, upon my own authority, in such a delicate matter and that I would have to be frank in advising Mr. Orescan that I would recommend to the Attorney General that this not be done for the reasons that I had previously stated.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

8:00 AM 27 MAY 1957
JFH: TLC
(7)

3 MAY 27 1957

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 5PM
DATE 5/27/57
BY MUR

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Nichols

May 16, 1957

Mr. Orescan stated he fully appreciated my views in this matter and he would convey them to the Chairman. Mr. Orescan then inquired of me as to what suggestion I might make with regard to who could make such an investigation, as the Chairman was determined to go into the matter promptly and thoroughly. I told Mr. Orescan that the only suggestion that I could make would be for the Chairman to seek the services of some ex-Agents because it was obvious that for such an investigation as the Chairman desired to be satisfactory, it would have to be made by individuals with previous intelligence experience. Mr. Orescan inquired of me as to whether I knew any ex-Agents who would be available and I told him that I did not. There was some reference then made to the possibility of securing the services of Mr. Ladd or Mr. Collier, and I told Mr. Orescan that both were excellent men, but I, of course, did not know of their availability and it would be up to the Chairman or representatives of Mr. Orescan's office to make appropriate inquiries along these lines. Mr. Orescan stated he would discuss the matter again with the Chairman, and if there was any question, he would promptly communicate with me.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

2 - Original & 1
1 - [REDACTED] Yellow
1 - [REDACTED] Ponder
1 - [REDACTED] Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

SAC, Washington Field

May 22, 1957

Director, FBI

[REDACTED]

62-80750-2988

RECORDED-42

[REDACTED]

EX-1
The above is being furnished to you for your
confidential information.


SJP:bjt
(6)

NOTE:

The above information [REDACTED] was
furnished to the Bureau [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The information was immediately referred to
the attention of the Investigative Division [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Jaslon _____
Johr _____
Parsons _____
osen _____
amm _____
ease _____
interrowd _____
ele. Room _____
olloman _____
andy _____



Mail Room ✓ JWB

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Mr. Wannall

SAC, Washington Field (orig & 1)
62-80750-2989

May 22, 1957

Director, FBI

78554

RECORDED - 31

b3


A large, empty rectangular box with a black border, occupying the top half of the page. It appears to be a placeholder for a figure or diagram that has not been included.

b3

b3

WRW:et (4)

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____



Mail Room ✓ WPA

water
W.P. 11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 20, 1957

FROM : S. J. PAPICHSUBJECT:

b3

*✓ Branigan**La Papich*

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

b3

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the
attention of the Espionage Section.

Re

SJP:vep
(4)
met

RECORDED - 31

*62-84750-2989**23 MAY 24 1957*

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Section
1 - Mr. Papich

INDEXED-31

*Let to wfo
5-22-57
WRW:et*

*checked wfo
Mo*

*WRW:et
5-W*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 22, 1957


FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach



SUBJECT: 

b3



Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

b3
b7D
b7E

Inasmuch as 
 the above information was
 furnished to that office on the afternoon of May 20, 1957.

b3
b7D
b7EACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt/jt
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Papich

62-10750-2990

RECORDED-11

INDEXED-11

10 MAY 24 1957

~~82 MAY 28 1957~~
 15
 63 MAY 31 1957

Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *Mr. A. H. Belmont*

DATE: May 24, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

b3

Agent Papich has learned that

W.M. Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Hesch
Moor
Hansen
Rosen
Jamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room

b3

b3

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt (5) *b7*
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED-32

INDEXED - 32

24 JUN 4 1957

INDEXED - 32

62-80750-2991

EX. - 116

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: May 27, 1957

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

b3

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

INDEXED-126

Branigan

On May 24, 1957, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
advised that [REDACTED]

b3 y

[REDACTED]

b3

The foregoing information was passed on to the
Washington Field Office on May 24, 1957 [REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt/w
(4)RECORDED-126
INDEXED-126

64-50450-2993

23 JUN 4 1957

1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Papich

S-7
FBI6000
67 JUN 10 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : **Mr. A. H. Belmont** DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: **29. 1952**

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

FBI AUTOMATIC E

DATE 03-1

FROM : Mr. R. R. REED

SUBJECT: ANDREW SZENTGYORGYI
INTERNAL SECURITY - HUNGARY

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 County _____

b3

b3

b3

Although the instant matter may be insignificant from the Bureau's over-all operations, it should be noted that the efficient handling in the field and at headquarters did the Bureau much good.

With regard to the situation at the New York Office on May 17, 1951 Mrs. Georgyi advised that her husband was a reporter and during the first few months of this year he had been

SJP:bjt (5) 64

62-80750-

NOT RECORDED
126 JUN 4 1957

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Brueggen
1 - Liebman, Schlesinger 1957

1. Latin Penitent

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont

RE: **ANDREW SZENTGYORGYI**
INTERNAL SECURITY - HUNGARY

developing information in the "Galindez case" and the attempted revolution in Cuba. She stated that he left New York on April 8, 1957, for Cuba and that she recently received a cable from him which gave the impression that he had interviewed Fidel Castro the Cuban rebel leader, and that he was proceeding to Havana and would be home within a week. Mrs. Szentgyorgyi advised that a week had passed and she now fears that her husband may have been detained by Cuban authorities.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

AB
1/28

HDR

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: May 29, 1957

To: Director, FBI

From: Legal Attaché, Paris (94-17)

Subject: [REDACTED]

b3
b7D

Re Paris let 3/13/57, Bulet 3/25/57 and Paris let
4/4/57.

[REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]

b7D

Accordingly, this office recommends that this office

[REDACTED]

ROL:AM
cc 66-128

162-80750-✓
NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 21 1957

b3
b7D

259
AUG 12 1957 10:30 AM '57

100% ORIGINAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: June 4, 1957

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

b3

SUBJECT: On June 3, 1957,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised that

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b3

*Callan*ACTION:The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Special Inquiry Section

b3

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 03-11-2013
 C24W16B80

SJP:bjt/jf
(4)1 - Mr. Callan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED .77

INDEXED .77

62-30450-2994

14 JUN 6 1957

MAX 105

6/10/57
*Callan*62-30450-2994
14 JUN 6 1957

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 5 1957

TELETYPE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

URGENT 6-5-57 10-25

AM CST

TO DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM SAC, SAN ANTONIO 1-P

Mr. J. P. Deich MK
7647

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, OWNER ONE NINE FIVE SEVEN TWO-DOOR DODGE, ONE
NINE FIVE SEVEN TEXAS LICENSE PLATES NO. JX THREE NINE FOUR NAUGHT,
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING-LIAISON.

REBUTEL JUNE FOUR. DEPARTMENT PUBLIC SAFETY RECORDS REFLECT
ONE NINE FIVE SEVEN TEXAS LICENSE JX THREE NINE FOUR NAUGHT
REGISTERED TO ONE NINE FIVE SEVEN DODGE SEDAN, SERIAL THREE
FIVE ONE NINE EIGHT SEVEN THREE NAUGHT, IN THE NAME OF JOSE
AGUIRRE, ONE ONE NAUGHT SEVEN KENNY, CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS,
WHICH IS IN HOUSTON DIVISION. NO STOLEN REPORT AND NO LIEN
ON AUTO. INDICIES NEGATIVE ON LICENSE NUMBER. NAME JOSE
AGUIRRE IS COMMON LATIN AMERICAN NAME, HOWEVER, NO INFO IN
SAN ANTONIO FILES THAT APPEARS PERTINENT TO INSTANT INDIVIDUAL.

RUC.

RECORDED-42 62-80750-2995

END AND ACK PLS.

12-28 PM OK FBI WA JS

TV DISC



b3

b JUN 11 1957

1-D F-97 50 JUN 14 1957

100 is

file 62-80750-2995
L. Johnson

62-80750-2996
CHANGED TO

62-104072-2

JUL 3 1957

W. C.

C

• Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: June 11, 1957

SP 7 CEC/ACW/P-1826
914/94 C.A. E.P-1826
914/94 C.A. E.P-1826
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/9/90 BY SP/PL/PAP
9803 200/mc
4/26/93

INITIALS ON ORIGINALS
Day

To: _____

Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Crowd _____
R. Room _____
Holloway _____
Candy _____

b3

Reference is made to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b3

Pursuant to instructions, Agent Papich informed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] b3

1-101-80750

Enclosure ENCLASURE

SJPabjt (11)

1 - Mr. Boardman 1 - Mr. Roach
 1 - Mr. Holloman 1 - Section Tickler
 1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Papich
 1 - Mr. Conrad
 1 - Mr. Parsons
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Day

6/14/57-1957-15
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum Mr. R. R. Roach to Mr. A. H. Belmont

RE: [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

b3

[redacted]

ACTION:

There is attached [redacted]

[redacted]

b3

gpt. R. R. Roach ✓
gpt. ✓

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 11, 1957

FROM : W. A. BRANIGANSUBJECT: ~~EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501~~

(Regulations Relating to Defense Information)

We are reviewing our classification procedures to strengthen them. Memo Belmont to Ladd. 10-9-53 regarding [redacted]

reflects [redacted]

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Roach [redacted]

b3

b3

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend our liaison representative obtain [redacted]

SBD:dmd
(5) Tic: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Roach
Mr. Papich

INDEXED - 4

RECORDED - 4

EX-117

62-80750-2999

JUN 19 1957

Memo Roach to Belmont
6-13-57 SJP/tjt

71 JUN 24 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 14, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

On June 12, 1957, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
advised Agent Papich that [REDACTED]

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Fason
Felt
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterbotham
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

✓ [Signature] ✓ [Signature] ✓ [Signature]

[Signature] ✓ [Signature] ✓ [Signature]

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

✓
SJP:bjt/w
(4)

✓ [Signature] ✓ [Signature] ✓ [Signature]

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED-57

62-80750-3000

INDEXED-5

JUN 20 1957

EX 108

R/134

71 JUN 27 1957

✓
R. R. Roach

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/4/57

FROM : Legat, Tokyo, Japan (66-4)

~~SECRET - AIR~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

b3

HLC:cs
(3).DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80EXP. PRICE
116-3110-35

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECORDED - 55

62-80750-3001

EX-117

20 JUN 1957

62-80750-3001

EJG

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 6-5-57

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Central Intelligence Agency

REMOVED BY 55-3030

FILE NUMBER 62-80750-✓

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 6-6-57

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL C.I.A.

REMOVED BY 6/6/57

FILE NUMBER 62-80750-✓

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 6-7-57

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *31a.*

REMOVED BY *30-301*

FILE NUMBER 62-80750-1

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Date: June 14, 1957
To: Director, FBI
From: Legat, Mexico
Subject: MEXICO CITY OFFICE
ADMINISTRATIVE

In various past communications I have mentioned

b3

Collier

ОДАИ

50

b3

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Enclosure (1)

2-Bureau

2-Mexico (lcc: 66-504A)

JNS:rgb

11

AND SPECIMENS RETAINED

62-80750
NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 28 1957

66 100-1457

Letter to Director, 6-14-57
Re: Mexico City Office
Administrative

[Redacted block]

b3

[Redacted block]

b3

[Redacted block]

The foregoing is primarily for the Bureau's general information. Unless the Bureau advises to the contrary, I will take no local action to alter the local situation, though I have, of course, cautioned all of our personnel of the need for utmost circumspection in daily operations.

I don't think we should send a deLEGATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 14, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

SYNOPSIS:

Reference: [REDACTED]

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Price
Wilson
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Yerkes *Rock*

[Large rectangular redacted area]

[Large rectangular redacted area]

Enclosure sheet 6-17-57

M.F. 1mm (6)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Espionage

1 - Section Tickler

1 - Mr. Papich

1 - Mr. Ferris

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS

TO: [REDACTED]

DISSEMINATION

MAIL FILE 100-356015-328

162-80750- ✓

NOT RECORDED

16 JUN 21 1957 JUN 24 1957

b3

ORIGINAL COPY

5 JAN 7 1972

b3

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: [REDACTED]

b3

RECOMMENDATIONS:

b3

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) If the above recommendation is approved, it is recommended that [REDACTED]

b3

(3) If the above recommendations are approved, it is recommended that the attached letter incorporating them be sent to the Phoenix office with a copy to the Legal Attaché in Mexico [REDACTED]

b3
b7D

lmpg
ofsk

4-528

62-80750-3002

CHANGED TO

66-19078-X

OCT 14 1960

mt/Bpp

(C)

GIR 11

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 21, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

In 1954 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
indicated that [REDACTED]

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

W
Roma

b3

On June 19, 1957, [REDACTED]
CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did advise that [REDACTED]

b3

RECORDED - 81

62-80750-3003

A review of the Bureau's files has failed to disclose any
information identifiable with [REDACTED]

23 JUN 25 1957

INDEXED - 81

ACTION:

Enclosed herewith is a letter advising [REDACTED]

b3

Enclosure *sent*
SJP:bjt (5) b7

1 Mr. Belmont

1 62-80750-3003

1 *62-80750-3003*

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTEREST IN THE UNITED NATIONS

2 - ()
1 -
1 - Mr. Belmont Section
1 - Mr. Branigan 1-Mr. Papich

June 24, 1957

GLR J

1-Liaison

Section

1-Mr. Papich

For sometime, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

2-1

b3

The Bureau recently received information that

Any such information developed by you should be directed to the Bureau's immediate attention.

For your information, and you, therefore, should be guided accordingly.

b3


SJP:bjt ft
(7)

Cover memo Roach to Belmont
same caption, dated June 21, 1957
SJP:bjt

RECORDED - 31

JHR 62-80750-
300
3004

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



Mail Room

64 JUN 24 1957

64 JUN 24 1957

C24W16B80

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : Legat, Tokyo, Japan (66-4)

SUBJECT: Central Intelligence Agency

DATE: 6/17/57



~~SECRET - ADT~~

b3


Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Borenman
Mr. Braden
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Refiled 3/26/57 and 6/4/57 reporting



b3



b3



b3

AJN:jar
(4)

53 JUL 8 1957

RECORDED - 31

INDEXED - 31

FILED

62-90150-3005
2-2
11 JUN 27 1957TICKET
100

COPY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

OFFICE MEMORANDUM * UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: RUNNING MEMORANDA MAINTAINED
IN THE LIAISON SECTION

DATE: June 12, 1957

The purpose of this memorandum is to call to your attention the number of running memoranda presently maintained in the Liaison Section and to recommend that some of these be discontinued due to the fact that there is no valid reason for their continued maintenance.

There are thirteen running memoranda maintained in the Liaison Section identified as follows, and grouped as those which it is felt could be discontinued and those which should be continued:

Memoranda Which Could be Discontinued

[Large rectangular redacted area]

Memoranda To Be Continued

Fund for the Republic

Highlights of Seat of Government Defense Plans for Chain of Command

Brief of Bureau Relocation Plans

Domestic Intelligence Division Defense Plans

History of Relations, Central Intelligence Agency

Referral/Consult

The memoranda pertaining to our relations with other agencies, namely, Army, Air Force, Navy, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and [redacted] were started many years ago when either our relations with them were not completely amicable or well-established, or the agencies were new. These memoranda served a very useful purpose in the past, but it has been noted in more recent years there has been little or no reference to them.

RRR:mls (5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Medler

1-Mr. Roach

1-Tieckle 1957/31

INDEXED

EX-91

62-80750-3006

NOT RECORDED

145 JUL 5 1957

63 JUL 8 1957/31

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
Re: Running Memoranda Maintained
In the Liaison Section

They, of course, have been kept up to date at all times. Keeping them up to date in effect is duplication of effort because nearly all of the factual data contained in these briefs are also contained in main files on the agencies involved or in individual case files. Such running memoranda are worthwhile and justifiable only if they serve an active and current need. Existing relations with Army, Air Force, Navy, CIA [redacted] are such that through liaison we are able to avoid the causes of conflict and to handle all matters that arise promptly, not permitting them to drag out and possibly cause trouble.

The memoranda pertaining to the histories of our relations with other agencies, with the exception of that memorandum pertaining to CIA, have outlived their usefulness. Although our relations with CIA are now satisfactory, this agency has extremely varied, extensive, and involved operations which present many fields of potential conflicts and differences. Therefore, it is felt that this particular memorandum (History of Relations, Central Intelligence Agency) should be continued for the time being. In view of current conditions, the need for many of the memoranda is not the same as when they were originated. By clearing out certain "deadwood" among our needed memoranda, we will be bringing our operations up to date and at the same time practice needed manpower economy.

The material maintained in the various running memoranda will not be destroyed, but will be put in the main file on each of the Agencies where it can be readily referred to, and if the need should arise in the future the material can be quickly brought up to date.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended:

(1) That the following running memoranda be discontinued:

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
Re: Running Memoranda Maintained
In the Liaison Section

Recommendation #1 continued:



(2) That the following memoranda be retained in the
Liaison Section:

Fund for the Republic

*Highlights of Seat of Government Defense
Plans for Chain of Command*

Brief of Bureau Relocation Plans

Domestic Intelligence Division Defense Plans

*History of Relations, Central Intelligence
Agency*

GIR 9
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: June 20, 1957

3/1

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mr.	_____
P.	b3
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

On June 19, 1957, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

advised that [REDACTED]

b3

According to [REDACTED]

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

INDEXED-46

RECORDED-46

62-80956-3007

8 JUL 2 1957

SJP:bjt/ljt
(4)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

FBI - DC

file in
5-Trusty

64 JUL 8 1957

GIR 2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 27, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

SUBJECT:

b3

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On June 26, 1957, by referral from

SA D. J. Sullivan

Liaison Section, talked to

R. J. Hogan
3
Korach
3

b3

Referral/Consult

b3

Referral/Consult

b3

Referral/Consult

RECORDED-46

INDEXED-46

62-80750-3008

23 JUL 3 1957

ACTION:

For information.

DIS: jlk (5) 71 JUL 11 1957
 1 - Mr. Belmont -
 1 - Mr. Papich
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Sullivan

SOT XH

ESD SP

Tolson

J. D. Sullivan

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*
 FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich *P*
 SUBJECT:

DATE: June 26, 1957

b3

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

*Mr. Medler**Conroy**Chief Rogers*
Room 5505

b3

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has

On June 25, 1957
 CIA. advised the Liaison Agent that

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the attention of the Name Check Section and the Records and Communications Division.

SJP:bjt
(5)

- 1 - Mr. L.N. Conroy
- 1 - Mr. Medler
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED-85

7/2/57, call back
 memo to [redacted] CLR/mjs
 62-80750-3009
 23 JUL 3 1957

6/26

6/26
 71 JUL 11 1957

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: July 3, 1957

b3

Branigan

Folson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b3

On the morning of July 3, 1957, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
 (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that [REDACTED]

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to
 the attention of the Espionage Section.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 03-11-2013
 CZ4W16B80

SJP:bjt/bjt
 (4)

1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 91
 INDEXED - 91
 12 JUL 8 1957

EX-110

62-80750-3010

Ferguson
 ESPIONAGE

PAPICH
 LIAISON

67 JUL 17 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/27/57

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (100-10145)

SUBJECT: **O** CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LIAISON

b3

Re blank memorandum entitled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] four copies of which
are enclosed.The confidential source as mentioned in paragraph one of
rememo is [REDACTED]b6
b7C
b7D
b7E[REDACTED] This source, on May 24, 1957, furnished
SA JOHN E. McCURRY [REDACTED][REDACTED] It is to be noted that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is filed in [REDACTED]b6
b7C
b7D

The confidential source mentioned in rememo [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
source of the Pittsburgh Office, whose identity should be
protected per request.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED] confidential security informant
of the Pittsburgh Office whose identity should be protected.b3
b6
b7C
b7D② - Bureau (RM) (Encs.-4)
2 - Pittsburgh

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 40

62-80750-3011

JEMC:rl
(4)No action under
EO10450 at this time
since info has beenENCLOSURE
Copy

64 JUL 15 1957

Banning
Stanley
Roeck

14 JUL 15 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 118-

PG 100-10145

b3

It is to be noted that [redacted] (Bufile 118-4573)
was investigated by the Bureau [redacted]
The Pittsburgh files contain no information of a derogatory
nature which is identifiable with [redacted]

Copies of rememo are submitted so that the Bureau can disseminate
this information to CIA at the Seat of Government. Pittsburgh
will not disseminate this information to the CIA at the local
level, UACB.

2 no or anyone general
[redacted] CIA
7/9/57
PDB

b3



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

June 27, 1957

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Re: [redacted]

b3

On May 24, 1957, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised the Pittsburgh Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that [redacted]

[redacted]
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

In regard to [redacted]

[redacted] who regularly

furnished information to the Bureau [redacted]
[redacted] advised on March 25, 1955, that [redacted]

[redacted]
b6
b7C
b7D

On October 13, 1955, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that [redacted]

The CP-USA, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On December 2, 1953, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, also known as the Western Pennsylvania Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, was organized in early December, 1953, at Pittsburgh.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64001-15-15
64001-15-15
ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Records of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, Pittsburgh, as examined on June 3, 1957, contained a report dated April 22, 1955, which indicated that [redacted]

b3

On August 31, 1955, [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Pittsburgh Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, that [redacted]

b3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: June 27, 1957

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
GOVERNMENT SECURITY
(Wright Commission)

b3

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to my memorandum to you of June 27, 1957,
captioned as above which is attached

Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Trotter
 Nease
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Crandy

The FBI, being exempted from the competitive Civil Service, is not
 now subject to the Lloyd-La Follette Act since this act applies only to the
 competitive Civil Service agencies.

NPC:akc

(7)

cc - Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Boardman

I am told it is not
 clear whether the
 Lloyd-La Follette
 act would apply
 to the Bureau under
 the Wright
 recommendations
 this will have to
 be clarified

NOT RECORDED
 26 AUG 1 1957

62-80750-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Mr. Callahan

DATE: July 2, 1957

FROM: C. L. Rogers

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3 ✓

Reference is made to the memorandum from S. J. Papich to R. R. Roach, dated June 26, 1957, advising that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3 ✓

RECOMMENDATION:

b3

In view of the fact that [REDACTED]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

✓ *Deagle*
162-80750-10003
NOT RECORDED
120 JUL 11 1957

20 JUL 10 1957

CLR:mjs
(5)CC - Mr. Jackson
CC - Liaison Section23 JUL 15 1957 *free*

Urgent

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

78555

Date: July 3, 1957
To: Director, FBI
From: Legat, Mexico (66-54) (100-743A)
Subject: [redacted]

b3
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

ReBulet to Phoenix dated June 19, 1957.

SA [redacted] of this office [redacted]
[redacted] has advised that [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] has
been an informant of this office since [redacted]
and has continually avowed his loyalty to this office and
to the Phoenix Office.

It is entirely possible that [redacted]

SP-65 PHOENIX 100-35605-328
1244

b3
b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau
2 - Mexico City (1 - 66-54)
MMR:mas (1 - 100-743A)
(4)

62-80750-1
77-42


b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

178556



[redacted] also advised that [redacted]



b3
b6
b7C
b7D

This matter will be closely followed and any pertinent developments will be immediately brought to the Bureau's attention.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013

Date: July 2, 1957 C24W16B80

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (66-128)

Subject: [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION CONCERNING

ReBulet to London 6/19/57.

[redacted] paid a courtesy call
on [redacted]

[redacted] was very friendly. He commented
that relations between the Bureau and CIA were cooperative.

[redacted] In this connection,
he spoke very warmly of Mr. SAM PAPICH of the Bureau.

The usual amenities were exchanged, but no policy
matters were discussed.

ROL:CM

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

62-2097-1
RECORDED - 36
INDEXED - 36
JUL 15 1957

58-13857
F77
13 1957

THREE
PERS. FILES
LAWRENCE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

4 TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: July 12, 1957

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3
b6
b7C

Branigan

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

On July 11, 1957 [REDACTED]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

advised that [REDACTED]

b3
b6
b7CA review of the Bureau's files has failed
to disclose any information concerning [REDACTED]ACTION:The above information is being directed to
the attention of the Espionage Section.b3
b6
b7C

SJP:bjt/bjt
(4)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

INDEXED-32
RECORDED-32

EX-131

62-80750-3013

21 JUL 16 1957

— —

5-F2 *[Signature]*UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
100-3515-85-1

64 JUL 22 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7-1-57

FROM : LEGAT, BONN

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 b3 1

Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____
 b3

64-21

b3

In the event Bufiles contain any information on [REDACTED] which would assist in my dealings with him, it is requested it be furnished.

2 - Bureau
 1 - Bonn
 GAV:

No Investigation Conducted by FBI
 Pertinent to your inquiry.
 This is the result of a request for an
 FBI file check only and is not to be
 considered as a clearance.

AGENCY Legat, Bonn (cc)
 REQ. REC'D 7-12-57
 DATE FORW. 5-15
 HOW FORW. Concur
 BY Concur

EX-PP-DCI
 JUL 6 1957
 35

EX - 116

RECORDED - 1
 INDEXED - 1

62-40750-304
 18
 16 JUL 5 1957

62 JUL 22 1957
 1528

[Signature]

[Signature]

Date: July 5, 1957
To: Director, FBI
From: Legat, Mexico (66-43)
Subject: MEXICO CITY OFFICE
ADMINISTRATIVE

Remylet June 14 last mentioning for the Bureau's
confidential information

b3

Last Sunday's edition of the important Mexico City
morning daily newspaper "Novedades" carried an item of interest
which will be set forth for the Bureau's information. There
is no present basis for feeling that this item was placed in
the papers by the Communists or the Soviets,

b3

[Large rectangular redacted area]

b3

The June 30 item in "Novedades" appeared in a column
written by AGUSTIN BARRIOS GOMEZ called "Ensalada Popoff"
(free translation - Society Salad). This column is one of
the most prominent ones in Mexico City, and on the Sunday in
question the lead item was as follows: (translation)

"Obeying the dictates of a gentlemanly diplomat, the
most excellent Ambassador of the United States in Mexico, Mr.

2 - Bureau
2 - Mexico City (1 - 66-54A)
JNS:plb
(4)

162-80750-
NOT RECORDED
48 JUL 25 1957

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

MC 66-43

FRANCIS WHITE, had the courtesy of taking leave not only of Mexican officials, of his hundreds of friends gained during four years as Ambassador, and of the Diplomatic Corps accredited in this country, but also of the employees of Uncle Sam's Embassy, and thus it was that he decided to go one by one through the various sections of the Embassy. On the faces (of the employees) one could note sadness and melancholy because they were losing not only their chief but also an understanding companion. The curious aspect of the matter had as its scene the 16th Floor, which is where is located the 'Intelligence Service.' Mr. WHITE knocked at the door and there appeared the face of a would-be Sherlock Holmes pocket edition. Chewing gum and examining him from head to foot, this person asked the Ambassador, 'Whom do you wish to see?' Mr. WHITE answered, 'I have come to take leave,' to which this member of the 'Intelligence Service' inquired, 'Who are you and whom do you come to take leave of?' This person should not be pardoned even though he is a recent arrival because at least he should have recognized the Ambassador from having seen his photograph."

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
b3

Office Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 3, 1957

FROM : Mr. E. R. Rotach

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b3
b7E

*6/28
8/3*

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____

b3
b7E *ady*

On July 3, 1957

CIA, advised Papich that [redacted]

Papich
b3
b7E

[redacted]

ACTION:

If you approve, Agent Papich will [redacted]

b3
b7E

T62-80750

170 [redacted] 12 1957

[redacted] 11 1957

SJP:bjt:lf

(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Minnich
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

57 JUL 22 1957

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24U16B80

SAC, Anchorage

Orig & 1
Yellow
Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich
July 19, 1957

RECORDED - 11 62 - 807.50 - 3015
Director, FBI

b3

Reference is made to

b3

SJP:bjt
(5)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

We have an understanding with CIA that its field offices will channel name check requests through CIA headquarters.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease ~~5~~ ⁶ _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/8/57

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE (62-266)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Anchorage letter to the Bureau 6/17/57 captioned
[REDACTED] and the Bureau's reply thereto of June 27
captioned [REDACTED]

reflect [REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

PROC

RECORDED - 11

Advice is requested as to whether the Bureau
would interpose any objection to this office [REDACTED]

b3

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Anchorage (62-266)
RBM:pdp
(3)

18 JUL 18 1957

26 to 1st 1st 1st 1st
7-11-57
28/7/57

Pay
LIAISON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The above information is significant in that [REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is interesting to note that [REDACTED] advised
Agent Papich that [REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

RECORDED-42

62-80750-3016

None. For your information.

INDEXED-42

20 JUL 23 1957

EX-126

SJP:bjtlyk
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Minnich
 1 - Liaison Section

55 JUL 26 1957
Papich

Lieber

GIR 9

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF COORDINATION

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) now has four Deputy Directors under Allen Dulles. They are: General Charles Cabell, Frank Wisner, Robert Amory and L. K. White. These, of course, are the top positions immediately under the Director of CIA.

✓
G 2 (8)
W
Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

b3

REDACTED

REDACTED

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt/bjt
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. M.W. Kuhrtz
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-11-86 BY SP/SP/SP/SP

#259493

RECORDED - 1
INDEXED - 1

18 JUL 23 1957

EX-131

308
64 JUL 30 1957

62-80750-3017

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

SAC, New York

2 - Orig & 1
1 - Mellow
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

July 24, 1957

Director, FBI

b3

b3

The Bureau has been advised that

b3

The above is being furnished for the information
of interested offices.

b3

Bureau

should be immediately advised. The Bureau has always been on the alert for any indication that this division might invade our jurisdiction and such a policy is to be continued.

1 - Albany
1 - Atlanta

RECORDED - 96

62-817521-3018

SJP:bjt^{ly}(7)

2 JUL 26 1966


NOTE: T

NOTE: (3) The above information concerning [redacted]
[redacted] was furnished to the Liaison Agent on
July 22, 1957, by [redacted]

b3

olson _____
ichols _____
bardman _____
elmont _____
ason _____
hr _____
rs ons _____
sen _____
mm _____
ase _____
nterrowd _____
le. Room _____
lloman _____
adv. _____

Nevertheless, it is believed the above should be passed on to the interested offices for future reference purposes.



Mail Room

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

July 24, 1957

BY COURIER SERVICE



b3

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is [redacted]

b3

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosed

NOTE: This is [redacted]

b3

1 - [redacted] (sent direct)

b3

Lu-

LEW:nma
(4)

LEW

BY COURIER SVC.
47 JUL 24
COMM-FBI

EX 105
RECORDED-42

762-80750-309
JUL 26 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71 JUL 31 1957

ALL ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

July 26, 1957

BY COURIER SERVICE


WT




b3

Dear Sir:

The following is



b3




b3

Very truly yours,

ccw

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NOTE:



b3

LEW:nma
(3)

RECORDED-57

BY COURIER SERVICE

53 JUL 29 EX-131

62-10700-3020-17

21 JUL 30 1957

RECEIVED
FBI - WASH. D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL ROOM

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

August 1, 1957

EX 105

62-80750-3021

RECORDED

INDEXED - 7


Dear [redacted]

b6
b7C

Your letter of July 22, 1957, with enclosure, has been received. While I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing the matter to my attention, the FBI has no jurisdiction in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



✓ RGE 1 8-20 bW.23

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosser _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

NOTE: Correspondent is not identifiable in ~~the~~ files. The matter to which he is referring appears to be a matter of internal policy consideration for CIA and there is no allegation or indication of deliberate espionage or unwarranted publication of confidential ~~material~~ material.

RGE:ogh off
(3)

MAIL ROOM

64 AUG 7 1957 F250

July 22, 1957.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:-

It is my firm belief that you are the greatest living American citizen and have done more for our country than any other single individual. Enclosed please find copy of my letter to Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles regarding the article on Central Intelligence Agency in the August issue of ~~Argosy~~ magazine.

I believe this article should never have been printed. If I am correct in my assumption, I know you will see that the necessary steps are taken to prevent a reccurance. If I am wrong, please accept my apology, however, I believe that every American citizen should speak up whenever he sees or hears anything that he believes is derogative to our nations security.

Very truly yours,

b6
b7C

EX 105

RECORDED - 7

INDEXED - 7

11 AUG 2 1957

CRIMINAL

July 22, 1957.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles,
United States Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:-

I am at a loss to understand why the article, "CIA, Our Invisible Sentinel" in the August issue of Argosy, was ever cleared for publication. The last two paragraphs refer to the ladies organization who wanted to compliment the CIA. The reply was, "If you praise us for the job we're doing you know more than you should" he said, "And if you know that much we can't be doing a good job.". If this statement be factual, then the article printed in Argosy would seem incongruous. It could be compared to a careless card player who exposes his hand before the final bet.

The Russian press can now supply undeniable proof that we are sending spies into Russia by reprinting this part of the article. "The climax of it all was that, though all four were Russians, the boys were American spies recruited in Germany by the United States Central Intelligence Agency-CIA for short-and had parachuted into Russian territory to wrong Mother Russia." Again quoting the article, "The secretive CIA wont even go that far, they are the world's champions in keeping mum." As Argosy sells at least a half million copies, this could hardly be termed "keeping mum".

The article further states that the best intelligence set up is only as good as it's security. Yet, the article describes how agents are trained, provided with forged passports, work permits, Communist party cards and similar documents, even to "knockout pills". If an agent is caught, wouldn't the "knockout pills" be the first thing the Russkies would try to find? Now let us examine the story about agent "X". Any dim witted Russian could backtrack this story and locate the tool and die works. If we still have an agent there, I would not want to be in his shoes. And, if the article had not been published, you might have used this tool and die works again, even though the agent was transferred after the incident. Then there is that part about the microfilm under the dot in the letter. I suppose many nations now use this form for deception, but why admit it? Will not every letter be more minutely scrutinized by the Russians after publication of this fact?

You may have had an ulterior motive in permitting the printing of this article, but to an average American like myself, you have provided the Russian press with an abundance of hate propaganda. Many spoken statements are sufficiently damaging, but when put in writing, they can be disastrous. As any attorney, you have probably told this to many clients. In my opinion, it is regrettable that you did not tell it to Argosy magazine.

Very truly yours,

b6
b7C

62-80750-3021

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 31, 1957

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: "CIA--OUR INVISIBLE SENTINEL"
ARTICLE IN ARGOSY MAGAZINE
AUGUST, 1957
CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holoman _____
Gandy _____

Above-captioned article was written by Henry Jordan, a free-lance writer.

Article deals with the history and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a favorable manner. Article notes that CIA was set up in 1947 by former President Truman as a "full-time and professional espionage organization." Author states that "the FBI resented being nudged out of the intelligence job it was doing in South America and frequent friction resulted." No other comment regarding the FBI was made in the article.

Article indicates that CIA "called the shots correctly" and helped prevent a possible war in discovering British and French plans to attack Egypt to regain the Suez Canal in October-November, 1956. The article also states that CIA representatives engineered the overthrow of the pro-Soviet Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. The author also states that CIA sources alerted the United States to shipments of communist arms from Poland to Guatemala for communist uprisings in 1954.

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED

b3

The article states that the first few years of CIA's existence were "marked by some fumbling" but asserts that difficulties were "ironed out" and CIA soon moved to the front rank of the world's espionage organizations. According to the author, the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) spends ten times as much money as CIA and is not as efficient as CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

60 AUG 16 1957

ENCLOSURE

15 AUG 8 1957

1 - Mr. Belmont

LIAISON

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2013
C24W16B80

RECORDED TO *SAC, Washington Field*
62-80750-3025
Director, FBI

2 - Orig & 1
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Liaison Section
August 21, 1957

1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

[Redacted]

b3

By letter dated April 2, 1957, the Bureau advised

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3


The above is referred to you for your information.
In the event you receive any complaints concerning [Redacted]
[Redacted] the Bureau should be immediately advised.

1 - New York (For information)

b3

MWK:bjt (?)ljt

30



26ub

AUG 30 1957 f-340

✓ Mail Room *nmf*

- 1 - Mr. Condon
- 1 - Section tickler
- 2 - Original and copy
- 1 - Yellow file copy

Legal Attaché, Tokyo (66-4)

August 30, 1957

Director, FBI (62-80750)

RECORDED-85

62-80750-3026
RELATIONS WITH CIA

b3
b7D

Reurlet 8/19/57 captioned as above.

It is not deemed advisable that

As set forth in Bulet dated August 22, 1957, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Internal Security - C." your request for

b3
b7D

The information regarding the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., was forwarded to your office as an enclosure to Bulet dated August 7, 1957, captioned "American Soviet Society, Information Concerning, Internal Security - C." (3)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review) *RJ*
JFC:hem *RJ*
(6)

NOTE: Relet requested information suitable for dissemination regarding the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.

b3
b7D

olson _____
nichols _____
wardman _____

JNC 30 10-22 88,25

卷之三

✓ Mail Room

70 SEP 9 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/19/57

FROM : Legat, Tokyo, Japan (66-4)

~~SECRET - AIR COURIER~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Partial Disclosure Agreement
Remylet 8/8/57 captioned CPIUSA, IS-C.

On [redacted]

advised that [redacted]

b3

Agent advised [redacted]

[redacted] b3

[redacted] b3

In the interest of [redacted]

it is [redacted]

25

recommended that [redacted]

b3

b7D

INTEGRITY
SECURITY

RECORDED-85

EX 105

62-89750-3026
9-5
10 AUG 27 1957HLC:cs
(8)a to Tokyo
8/30/57
FBI Tokyo

A. J. G. LIAISON

EXP. PROC.

Office Memo

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

GIR 1

DATE: August 30, 1957

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
ARTICLE, SEPTEMBER, 1957, ISSUE "ESQUIRE"
ENTITLED "CIA: HOTTEST ROLE IN THE COLD WAR"

Reference is made to the enclosed article concerning CIA which appeared in the September, 1957, issue of "Esquire"; the article is authored by Enno Hobbing. The theme of the article is very pro-CIA. The agency is characterized as doing an efficient job. A statement is made that CIA is "more closely checked than any other Government agency." With regard to CIA's accomplishments, Hobbing gives credit to CIA for obtaining a copy of the secret speech made by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress. Considerable space is devoted to CIA's development of defectors and recruitment of agents.

b3

There is only one reference to the FBI. Hobbing makes the statement "Then there are in CIA the ex-FBI men, who bring with them the investigative talents of an older organization, in which they perhaps did not have the chances to advance that a new one offered."

b3

On August 27, 1957

CIA, confidentially advised Agent Papich that

The article describes Hobbing as having served in U. S. Army Intelligence during World War II. Bureau files indicate that in June 1952, Hobbing, as a representative of "Time" magazine, called at the Bureau and inquired for information concerning the Bureau's interest in the investigation of security risks at the United Nations. He was not given any information. (62-77787-4413).

Referral/Consult

In 1943, the Bureau investigated Reimar Friedrich Hobbing who appears to be the father of Enno Hobbing. The investigation of the father was predicated on an allegation that he might be a Nazi sympathizer. Reports indicate that the father had been a German officer.

Enclosure

SJP:bjt (7) b7C

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Nichols

1 - Mr. Branigan

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Central Research

RECORDED - 73

INDEXED - 73

EX-131

63 SEP 12 1957

34 1 - Mr. Papich

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ENCLOSURE
AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
GUIDE

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
ARTICLE SEPTEMBER, 1957, ISSUE "ESQUIRE"
ENTITLED "CIA: HOTTEST ROLE IN THE COLD WAR"

in World War I; that he was a naturalized U. S. citizen and that his son, Enno, had been born in Germany. The investigation did not develop information reflecting that the father was a Nazi sympathizer. (100-249476). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (100-365730-38).

b3

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*jar
8/28
9
grm
grm
✓
8/28
gm*

62 9A750-3027 INCLOSURE

CIA

An expert's intimate picture of the U.S.'s growing spy system and how it scored a decisive victory over Khrushchev

I'm so good that I could swagger.
I know things that would make you stagger.
I'm 90 per cent cloak . . . and 10 per cent dagger.
Boo-boo, baby, I'm a spy.

SINCE the days in World War II when a puckish Istanbul orchestra played this song every time an unmistakably American intelligence officer entered its café, the U.S. intelligence business has shucked any and all quixotic romanticism. It is cold and serious big business now, with upwards of 8,000 people employed by the pre-eminent U.S. intelligence organization, the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA work, for all its partaking of many of the monotonous characteristics of corporate enterprise, is today the pursuit where an American in peacetime supremely looks into the soul of others and his own. The CIA man is more constantly, closely and tellingly at grips with his Communist opposite number than any other American. The CIA man may penetrate those state secrets the Reds want to hide and he conceals the American secrets the Reds seek. The CIA man may discreetly disinfest a foreign political climate poisoned by Red insinuations. Or the CIA man moves swiftly through foreign political back rooms, to rescue and revive a friendly government and a friendly people who were on the verge of being choked by Communist pressure. Where he succeeds, the CIA man gets no public acclaim, but has the unmatched reward of knowing that he, in the night, massaged the heart of freedom back to life.

Within the last year, the CIA men have had loaded on them the biggest range of responsibility that they have borne in their decade of existence. (The CIA was established in September, 1947, when the lessons of World War II made it apparent that the many disparate intelligence activities of U.S. government departments needed a center and a head.) As long as Joseph Stalin ran the U.S.S.R., the East-West struggle was bluff and blatant, noisily black and white. With the advent of Nikita Khrushchev, it has become a much more subtle proposition. Clandestine activities in the Stalin era, it seems fair to say, had a vital tactical significance. But Khrushchev has inaugurated what may properly be called "the clandestine era," where such work is of strategic scope. In the place of the old hammer-handed Communist motto that "who is not for us is against us," Khrushchev seems to have substituted silkily, "who is not against us is for us." He has announced a deceptive, dulcet campaign of competition for men's loyalties that Whittaker Chambers has described as possibly making Communism "radioactive" again.

But Nikita Khrushchev did not succeed in starting that campaign with the surprise and the finesse he had hoped. The CIA spoiled his start, and in so doing declared that the U.S. was prepared to counter him on his own clandestine grounds.

When the U.S. last year published to the world what Khrushchev had spoken in secret at the decisive 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Communist party, the CIA was reputedly responsible. One of its operatives is believed to have obtained a copy of the speech abroad and sent it to CIA in Washington. (Curiously enough, one of the few things not secret about the CIA is its location. Over the entrance at 2430 "E" Street is a sign proclaiming that it is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence

by ENNO HOBMING

HOTTEST ROLE IN THE COLD WAR

Agency.) Its publication, through the channels of the State Department, wrecked the cautious timetable that Khrushchev had presumably set for letting the speech and its radical implications trickle down through the world-wide Communist apparatus. The various Communist parties, instead of being spoon-fed de-Stalinization through a gentle dosage of Kremlin directives, grew visibly sick.

Thousands of members quit the Communist parties, in a mass defection probably unmatched since the disillusionment of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Those who remained clashed in bitter factional fights in their own countries—and remonstrated excitedly with a Moscow that was unprepared for their knowing so much about the new line so soon. The political potential of the Red International plummeted sharply downward. At the same time, all the anti-Communists were explicitly warned of the new tactics of cajolery and camouflage that Moscow had in mind. As an erstwhile CIA critic grudgingly exclaimed, "With the publication of the Khrushchev speech, CIA certainly justified whatever it spent last year."

The story of how CIA got hold of the Khrushchev speech could conceivably be told. But the telling would contribute more to the Soviets, in hinting how they might break up an excellent American "penetration" of their apparatus, than it would to American public enlightenment. Suffice it to say that the CIA has at its disposal an ample battery of ways to procure Communist documents. Coded Communist communications can be monitored and the codes broken. Communist couriers can have their pouches rifled and the contents photographed and replaced, all without their knowledge. Communist defectors may turn up as "walk-ins" at a CIA "front" installation and deliver a bagful of vital papers—something like turning state's evidence in an American court proceeding. Or there may be at CIA's command that living paragon of clandestine assets, the "defector in place"—i.e., a Communist who has broken with the party without the party's knowing it, and who now uses his party position to feed a stream of documents and oral reports to his CIA "case officer" in regularly scheduled meetings in a CIA controlled "safe house." By one or more of these ways, CIA presumably scored its coup in procuring the Khrushchev speech.

A word to the worried, who by now may be concerned about the



Ever since he served U.S. Army Intelligence in World War II, Enno Hobbing has been a fascinated student of intelligence organizations and their methods. This interest was particularly spurred when, after the war, he had the opportunity to interrogate the leading members of Hitler's spy system. His career since the war has taken him into numerous areas ridden with international intrigue; he was the editor of *Die Neue Zeitung*, the U.S. military government German-language newspaper, when it was published in postwar Berlin, and he has been a news correspondent both abroad and in Washington

propriety of American involvement in such shenanigans. The intelligence business is at least as old as the time when Joshua sent spies into Jericho. The purpose of intelligence work has always been quite simple: to discover in just what way the enemy was lying, to help and save friends in the enemy camp, to protect the intelligence man's own people against foreign trickery and treachery. But the importance of intelligence has never been higher in history than today, when the Communist empire avowedly works on two levels: the diplomatic and public for sheer purposes of deception, the covert and quiet to slaughter the sheep who believe what Moscow officially professes. Yet some Americans in 1957 persist in the Wilsonian ideology of 1917, of "open covenants openly arrived at," and decry U.S. clandestine activities. Others adhere to the maxim of the redoubtable Henry L. Stimson who, as Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover, closed down the tiny secret section of the State Department with the observation that "gentlemen do not read other people's mail." Both these postures lost their validity after 1945, when international communism became a commanding menace on the international scene. Indeed, for the U.S. public today in peacetime to have qualms about the existence of CIA as a civil shield of the republic makes about as much sense as to have qualms about the existence of the Strategic Air Command and the H-bomb as a military shield.

What is of concern to the public, just as the quality of U.S. missiles, bombs, planes and pilots are of concern, is the quality of U.S. spies. How well qualified are the CIA men to take up the inescapable gauntlet that Khrushchev has thrown down?

CIA men come in a kaleidoscopic variety of shapes, sizes and qualities—as they do in all human institutions. The director of CIA, the grey and genial sixty-four-year-old Allen W. Dulles, is a former Wall Street lawyer. His chief value to his law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, was not, however, in his command of legal details. Instead, Dulles was regarded by his legal partners as, first, a superb customer's man and, second, the man who was willing to make the decisions they were reluctant to take. Both these talents stand Dulles in excellent stead in his job as director of the Central Intelligence Agency today.

From Wall Street to CIA via OSS

The former customer's man is generally regarded as the peer of American "case officers." He built that reputation with the World War II OSS in Geneva, Switzerland. There he secured a fantastic bow of vital reports—the date of the Nazi attack on Russia, the location of the main V-1 bases—out of Hitler's Germany. He did it by instilling in German agents like the celebrated "George Wood" (whose real initials were K.F.) the same mixture of confidence in him and attachment to the U.S. that he had once instilled in the clients of Sullivan & Cromwell. From his practical experience in intelligence details, Dulles as CIA chief has an intimate understanding of the problems of his lower echelons. His capacity to make decisions naturally serves CIA well too. He has been known to break up divided and uncertain meetings of his top advisers with a confident wave of the hand, "The operation will go on."

Next to Dulles in the CIA hierarchy is the sparsely sandy-haired and deeply Southern Air Force Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell. He was formerly the boss of the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, and represents the CIA potential for effective co-operation with the military intelligence services. The presence of Cabell, like that of Dulles, underscores the fact that while the CIA itself is only ten years old, it operates with American intelligence experience of considerably better vintage. In Cabell's wake in the CIA come many former officers from the military intelligence services who find their flair for espionage better rewarded in the CIA than in the services, where line and all-around performance is at premium; and service, supply and communications officers who provide CIA with a hard core of logistical know-how. Dulles, in his turn, heads a CIA contingent that includes lawyers who by temperament prefer to be the principals, rather than the counselors, in an action; former business executives who in the middle of life suddenly hanker after rewards beyond money; and young men of private means who are unselfishly eager to redeem their unearned good luck.

Then there are in CIA the ex-FBI men, who bring with them the investigative talents of an older organization, in which they perhaps did not have the chances to advance that a new one offered. There are émigrés, Germans who fled Hitler, Russians and many other nationalities, with their varying wealths of language and area expertise. A sizable CIA category consists of ex-academics, who can have more fun, make money and pursue action rather than abstraction in the intelligence business. These include scholars with staggering linguistic gifts and poetical types with an incredibly sensitive apperception of the psychological mo-

tions of potential agents. Finally, as it must to all organizations, there comes to CIA the crowd of secretaries, budget officers, personnel directors and other administrative officers who, while they use the same talents that are required in non-secret work, share the clandestine atmosphere.

A secular monkishness unites all these men from very diverse backgrounds. They are really excluded from the inquisitive and open American society, where everyone is expected to answer the question, "What do you do?" Those in the "overt" part of CIA, the section devoted to research and to the compilation and evaluation of the flood of intelligence information that pours in, can admit to working for CIA. But at the next question, "What do you do there?" they must clam up; and they must sit mum and feignedly ignorant through many a dinner conversation where an amateur rattles off his views on the very subject on which the CIA man is an expert. For if he identifies what he is doing, or if he shows what he knows and thinks, the CIA man pinpoints a secret preoccupation of the U.S. government or a secret policy. The "overt" side of CIA is responsible, at the head of a task force from the military and other government intelligence agencies, for the preparation of the National Intelligence Estimates—the closely reasoned and finely qualified studies of foreign countries and international issues that distill everything overtly or covertly known to the U.S. into objective analyses for the National Security Council and its chairman, the President himself. If an "overt" CIA man talks, and it gets about, the Soviets will have clues to the innermost councils of the U.S. administration.

The members of the "covert" side of CIA, the one that through secret operations collects the information or creates the circumstances which the "overt" side evaluates, must keep themselves even more under wraps. Ideally, they should be able to claim plausibly some occupation totally different from CIA. But the task of acquiring "cover" and keeping it is tricky and arduous. For example, it is practically impossible for a CIA man to masquerade as a journalist because the journalistic fraternity is a close-knit and gregarious one, where everybody knows roughly what everybody else is up to, and where, moreover, a man who does not get published an amount of copy that requires his full working time soon finds himself under suspicion. Business "cover" is theoretically more practical; an agent could have a relationship with a firm that would leave him partly free for his CIA work. But, the claims of the Communists that capitalism and CIA activities go hand in glove notwithstanding, American companies are notably cool to the idea of putting agents on their payrolls. Blocked at many a turn by the open-and-aboveboard American way of doing things, "covert" CIA men must devise some kind of "cover" as best they can. Often, it means they just have to keep out of sight as much as possible.

This means that for social life and intellectual stimulus, the "covert" CIA operatives are really thrown on each other. Their wives cannot be told what they are doing. Their children are put off with some vague story and not infrequently get the idea that their dedicated fathers don't amount to much in the world. Neighbors barge in, expansive about their own affairs, and feel a slight chill when the CIA man does not talk as freely of himself. When the covert operative goes on his tours of overseas duty, he is again confined to a small sector of the foreign human scene, denied the expansive pleasures that living abroad can have. No matter where he is, the operative works odd hours, often meeting his contacts at night and sometimes dropping from view for weeks and months—while his wife worries helplessly and he has little idea if something has not struck his family that requires his presence at home.

To these personal deprivations, official ones must be added. Security is the first requirement of intelligence work; therefore the operative knows that, rather than being implicitly trusted by his superiors, he is necessarily under their constant scrutiny for any signs that he may be disloyal. If he gets into any kind of official row with a boss or a colleague—and this happens in any organization—he should not take his case to any public court of appeal. Worst of all, if the operative falls into Communist hands, he knows that his government has to disavow him. It is a claustrophobic environment, in which only the very strong and the supremely devoted survive to do well.

The CIA just has to take it

Just as the CIA man has no public recompense or redress, he and his organization have no defense against public attacks. When someone cries out after a national fiasco, "Where was our intelligence?" CIA lacks the privilege of producing proof that it was right there. When CIA is accused of doctoring the National Intelligence Estimates to serve the political purposes of a current administration, the CIA cannot put its outraged refutation on record. The only charge against it that the CIA

can readily rip apart without betraying its own mission is that it has practically arrogated unchecked control of U.S. foreign policy.

Actually, the CIA is perhaps more closely checked than any other government agency. The inborn instincts of the democratic process, ever on guard against secret concentrations of strength, have seen to that. Seven of the most respected and responsible members of the U.S. Congress form an *ad hoc* working group privy to CIA operations. The CIA budget, which is packed into other appropriations for purposes of concealment from foreign enemies, is known to selected officials in the Bureau of the Budget and several members of Congress. In the last few years, two notable committees have been through the agency stem to stern, one headed by Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle, the other by General Mark W. Clark. Today there is in existence the President's board for checking on the CIA. It is headed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology President James R. Killian, Jr., and includes such knowledgeable figures as former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett, Doolittle, steel magnate Henry Ryerson and others. This board, with full access to CIA activities, must report to the President twice a year. Meanwhile, Allen Dulles reports to the National Security Council every week.

Since the CIA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, it must also co-ordinate closely and constantly with the pre-eminent U.S. foreign policy agency, the Department of State. (The joint decisions of State and CIA are subject to National Security Council approval.) State may counsel against undertaking some operations on the ground that there could not be "plausible denial" of the U.S. hand if the operations were "blown", i.e., publicly exposed, and that the damage to U.S. interests from a "blown" operation might be greater than what the operation could hope to achieve. However, considering the effrontery with which the Soviets deny participation in clandestine operations in which they have been caught Red-handed, it may well be that the U.S. should consider "implausible denial" as sufficient.

Among the things that CIA is permitted to do, one function is obvious: intelligence procurement. Several others are matters of speculation.

CIA extracts Communist secrets by research, by technical means and by straight agent operations. CIA analysts read everything published and obtainable from the Communist orbit. Between the lines, they find a wealth of information that the Communists would like to keep concealed, but which they unconsciously imply in what they say. The CIA analyst's job is of course immensely more complicated than that of his Communist opposite number, who can take American publications at face value. The CIA analyst is the man who must overcome the intelligence advantage that the Soviets gain by censorship.


Electronic leakage: for and against

The CIA technical specialist also competes against formidable Communist opposition. Any U.S. embassy or diplomat's home behind the Iron Curtain is "bugged" by the Red landlords, who conceal electronic audio surveillance devices with extraordinary skill and imagination. Outside the Iron Curtain, Red agents attempt to install such devices in important U.S. headquarters. The enemy listening gadgets must not only be found so that American official business can be transacted in privacy; it must also be assumed that some of them are not found as soon as they are put in. In retaliation, CIA men presumably go about the business of "bugging" Communist offices so that there is at least as much electronic intelligence leakage out of them as out of U.S. offices.

But exhaustive reading and ultramodern electronics cannot and will not replace the classic figure of all intelligence work, the agent. How does a CIA man recruit a member of the Communist apparatus for U.S. service?

CIA obviously never reveals its methods to outsiders. But the whole process of wooing agents has been practiced by many nations over many centuries. And since a human equation is always involved in recruitment, it is doubtful that CIA has discovered anything new in the field. The classic pattern of agent recruitment transposed into CIA circumstances can be fairly closely imagined.

The process may begin with an analyst in Washington. He may note that Mr. Z, in a foreign Communist apparatus, was passed over for promotion. Playing a hunch that Z might be miffed, the analyst may go to CIA's vast collection of personal dossiers and examine Z's biography for "vulnerabilities." Has he been in trouble with the party before? Then he might be promised assistance and asylum in return for certain services to the U.S. Does he lean toward "national Communism"? Then a limited bargain might be struck where he and the U.S. co-operate against Russian influence on his country. Is he highly intellectual or idealistic? Then CIA might envisage sending one of its top ideological debaters to win him



away from Communism. In any event, Mr. Z, unbeknownst to him, has now been "spotted for recruitment."

The next step is the "approach." A CIA case officer in Z's country obviously should not approach Z cold. If Z refused to be recruited, the case officer would not only be "blown." He might be expelled from Z's country, his other operations endangered, the whole U.S. penetration of the local Communist party jeopardized. In dire emergencies, CIA men can make successful "cold approaches" to key foreign nationals and secure their co-operation in the nick of time. But in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, it is essential that a third party be employed between the case officer and the potential agent to feel the latter out.

In Z's case, the CIA man might use a Communist party clerk or chauffeur who is already on the CIA payroll. He would be instructed to try to get a job near Z, where he could observe him and gradually gain his confidence. Then he would report regularly to the case officer on Z's moods, opinions and problems. Sifting these reports, the case officer might eventually decide that Z seemed ripe for the crucial "approach."

This is, of course, one of the most tense and chilling moments in the intelligence business, and has to be prepared with maximum care. The clerk or chauffeur might be chosen to do it, if his psychological relationship to Z seems sufficiently strong for him to convince Z to turn agent. But in case the clerk or chauffeur should fail, the crucial rendezvous has to be held in a site—preferably a CIA-controlled "safe house"—from which he can speedily be evacuated to safety, before the outraged Z can turn him over to the police. Alternatively, another already employed local agent might be injected into the picture—with similar precautions for his safety. In that case, the man who had been reporting on Z would not be exposed. He could either keep further tabs on Z if the approach failed, or he could serve as a check on Z's loyalty while Z is working as an agent. Or, depending on circumstances, the CIA man could make the decisive approach himself. This is frequently necessary because foreign agents want the visible assurance that they are actually dealing with the U.S. and will enjoy whatever protection the U.S. can give them during their hazardous duty.

Recruitment of an agent

The "approach" scene compels the CIA man to marshal all his knowledge, authority and persuasive powers with the resourcefulness of a top-notch lawyer—and with the knowledge that, if his argument fails, he pays the penalty of the client. But if Z capitulates, the CIA man then moves relievedly on into the "recruitment," the fixing of the objectives, communication arrangements and compensation aspects of the new agent-case officer relationship.

Z will be given precise instructions as to the type of information he is to obtain and pass on. He may communicate with the case officer through a "dead drop," an innocuous-looking address to which the agent reports are mailed, or some physical spot where the agent leaves them and the case officer picks them up. A "live drop" may be used, a store or professional office where the agent leaves his reports, disguised perhaps as a package, which the case officer collects without the "live drop's" knowing what it is all about. Again, a "cut-out" may be injected, another agent who can meet Z with more safety—and then Z may hardly see the case officer at all. Or regular "safe-house" meetings may be scheduled between Z and the case officer. For these, there would always be prearranged "emergency signals" in case either one felt he had been followed to the rendezvous. Other signals would be devised to warn that either party had to skip a rendezvous. Finally, as the last detail of the "recruitment," a form and a rate of compensation will be arranged. It is a mistake to assume that agents generally work for money. Many do it simply for anti-Communist reasons.

With good luck, Z and the case officer may work together for years in the same country. Meanwhile the U.S. would profit from a constant flow of secret information out of Z's party. But the day may also come when Z is no longer safe as a "defector in place." Then he has to be evacuated, often to the U.S. There, after he has been thoroughly "debriefed," after CIA men have for weeks and months gone over all the knowledge that he might not have had time to communicate in his necessarily infrequent and brief meetings with the case officer abroad, Z may be "surfaced." This means that Z will be permitted to appear at a press conference or some other appropriate forum. There he will tell the world those secrets of his Communist apparatus that are of no use to CIA in the planning or execution of further agent operations, but do have an anti-Communist propaganda value.

An outstanding example of a "surfaced" defector is Joseph Swiatlo, the former colonel in the UB, the Polish secret police, who fled to the West in

1953. What Swiatlo told the world and his own Polish people about the machinations of the UB completely discredited the UB and the Stalinist apparatus in Poland. It directly paved the way for the Gomulka take-over of power in October 1956—and helped to hand Nikita Khrushchev his humiliating defeat when he flew to Warsaw to halt Gomulka, and failed.

This shadow area on the fringe of the intelligence business has been extended by some press reports claiming that the CIA had a hand in rescuing the country of Iran from Communist infiltration and that of Guatemala from a Communist government. Such press assertions have never been proved. But naturally they lead to speculation as to how the CIA might be of help in similar situations.

The speculation can only be pursued by glancing at the extensive operations of the Communists in the field generally known as "political warfare." It is known that the Soviets subsidize the propaganda work of Communist parties all over the world. It is known that the Soviets are masters of the art of partisan warfare and have set up potential guerrilla armies in many countries. (In France, for instance, it is estimated that the Communists can call on some 50,000 "durs" for an armed civil uprising if they should judge the moment opportune.) Moreover, the Soviet hand has been plainly visible in such postwar, *coups d'état* behind the Iron Curtain as Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Poland. In each instance, it was evident that the Soviet ambassador or some special deputy arriving from Moscow steered the local Communists through their piece-meal whittling down of the democratic forces and presided over the final liquidation of the democratic process.

Strength where it is needed

It is certainly to be hoped that the CIA has at its disposal some countervailing talents and assets to such Soviet stratagems. It would be cruel indeed if, say, the Ruritanian Democratic Party in still-free Ruritania succumbed to the Communists because it did not have as much skilled assistance and advice from the U.S. as the Ruritanian Communists inescapably receive from the Soviets. Especially in underdeveloped countries, where the science of government is often at a low ebb and where the Soviets pour in funds and agents in order to exploit the chaos, it seems desirable for the U.S. to assist the democratic forces to develop proper security measures against the Red enemy. And where a Communist coup may be in the making, it appears almost mandatory for the U.S. to put some mature political skill and strength at the disposal of its friends. Often the beleaguered democratic forces abroad could not openly appeal to the U.S. for this kind of help, because the Communists would hypocritically but tellingly raise the cry of "imperialism." The help would have to be secretly provided.

The public speculations on the CIA role in Iran and Guatemala provide hope—but no real assurance—that the U.S. is at last catching up with the Soviets in its capacity to bail out its sinking allies in many parts of the world.

All the things he does—and the added things that he probably ought to do—throw a tremendous burden of responsibility on the CIA man, for which he gets small pay and less recognition.

Why does he stay on the job?

For one thing, he is a child of his time, the clandestine era. He is like the mountain climber who ascends the peak "because it is there." The Soviets are there with their vast subversive apparatus; someone has to conquer it on behalf of the U.S. Anyone who thinks that proposition through may find himself mailing a job application to Allen Dulles. His organization consists largely of men who have.

A CIA man's epitaph is his own

Then, odd as it may sound to the conventional man, CIA work satisfies a profound sense of morality. The abstract devotee of the "nonintervention" school of political thought will stand by in pious horror as Communists take over people and nations. He will do nothing about it because that would be "intervention" too. For a professor's mess of potage, he is ready to let human beings and human heritages pass into bloody oblivion. He will, however, write an eloquent epitaph. The CIA man believes that only those things are moral that are real. If by intelligence work in all its ramifications he can save lives and happiness and free institutions in a jungle world, that is civilized and right with him.

Lastly, the infinitely complex clandestine age takes on for its intimate U.S. participants a splendid simplicity. Across the street from the CIA agent, maybe next door, invisible but ever-present is the enemy, his Communist counterpart. Amid the organizational jungle of modern life, the CIA man's task is as clean and exhilarating and individually crucial as ancient single combat. #

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- Section tickler
- Mr. Thornton
- Mr. Belmont
- Original and copy
- Yellow file copy

65-14672-3028

Date: September 3, 1957

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
3430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED - 83

Attention: [redacted]

b3

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]

b3

Reference is made to [redacted]

b3

With reference to [redacted]

FBI C O U R I E R S M C
O - SEP 4
O - 1957

44-38472-210

A copy of [redacted]
by this Bureau.

would be appreciated

b3

JFC:hem NOTE: Based on memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont
(6) dated 8/30/57. JFC:hem Classified "Secret" to correspond with
incoming.

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